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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, public acceptance and understanding of 
mental retardation has grown.1  Society presently accepts people with 
disabilities and emphasizes community-based programs that provide 
the disabled with education and support services.2  In the past, 
however, stereotyping, discrimination, and mistreatment of the 
mentally retarded was so horrific that the United States Supreme 
Court described it as “grotesque.”3  The public believed that mental 
retardation was the “principle source of criminal and immoral 
behavior in society.”4  Consequently, to protect society, the 
government forced the institutionalization and sterilization of many 
people with mental retardation.5 
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 1 V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded from the Death 
Penalty: A Comment on Florida’s Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 459-60 
(1991). 
 2 Seguin Services, History of Disability Services in the United States, at 
http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/3594/history.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter History of Disability Services]. 
 3 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985). 
 4 Cohen, supra note 1, at 459.  The “Jukes Study,” conducted by Robert Dugdale, 
linked degenerate behavior by members of the Jukes family to an inherited mental 
deficiency.  History of Disability Services, supra note 2.  This study, in connection with 
increasing public awareness of genetics, contributed to the popular view linking 
“idiocy, pauperism, insanity, and crime” to genetics.  Id. 
 5 Cohen, supra note 1, at 459-60.  Protection of society included the idea of 
protecting the gene pool.  History of Disability Services, supra note 2.  Consequently, by 
1926 there were mandatory sterilization laws in twenty-three states, and between 1925 
and 1955 the government forced over 50,000 mentally retarded individuals to 
undergo sterilization.  Id.  In an infamous 1926 decision, the Supreme Court upheld 
the forced sterilization of a retarded woman stating: 
[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.  The principle that sustains compulsory 
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In the 1950s, society began to realize that there was no link 
between mental retardation and criminality and attitudes towards 
mental retardation started to change.6  During the next two decades, 
a government panel on mental retardation focused the public’s 
attention on the mentally retarded and their unique needs.7  Parent 
organizations also demanded that their children be educated in the 
same schools as non-disabled children.8  Finally, in 1977, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled 
that, once institutionalized by the state, the mentally retarded have “a 
constitutional right to be provided with minimally adequate 
habilitation under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the 
purpose of the commitment.”9  Following this landmark decision, a 
large deinstitutionalization movement across the country led to the 
development of home and community-based services with a focus on 
self-determination and individualized support in the least restrictive 
environment.10 
Simultaneously, the use of the death penalty evolved to limit the 
sentence of capital punishment to those murders society views as 
particularly heinous.11  A dramatic reduction occurred in the number 
and types of crimes punishable by death.12  From colonial times until 
the nineteenth century, most states automatically imposed the death 
penalty for all homicides and for many felonies.13  During the 
 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.  
Three generations of imbeciles are enough. 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 6 Cohen, supra note 1, at 460. 
 7 Id. 
 8 History of Disability Services, supra note 2. 
 9 Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 
1977).  The court in Halderman found that the United States Constitution required 
that state institutions provide “such minimally adequate habilitation as will afford a 
reasonable opportunity for them to acquire and maintain such life skills as are 
necessary to enable them to cope as effectively as their capacities permit.”  Id. at 
1325.  The court noted that “involuntarily committed retarded children have a 
constitutional right ‘to a program of treatment that affords the individual a 
reasonable chance to acquire and maintain those life skills that enable him to cope 
as effectively as his own capacities permit with the demands of his own person and of 
his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental and social efficiency.’”  
Id. at 1317 (citing Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)).  The 
court ordered immediate steps be taken to move the residents from Pennhurst to 
community facilities that could provide minimally adequate habilitation.  Id. at 1325. 
 10 History of Disability Services, supra note 2. 
 11 Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, Overview of Death Penalty and Capital 
Trials, 50 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 1, 4-5 (1994). 
 12 JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 509 (4th ed. 2000). 
 13 Id. 
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nineteenth century, states gradually began restricting the death 
penalty to first-degree murders, and eventually began allowing the 
judge or jury to decide when to impose a death sentence.14 
For a brief period of time during the 1970s, the Supreme Court 
held that the then existing death penalty schemes were 
unconstitutional.15  The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the death 
penalty,16 but has repeatedly increased the constitutional limitations 
on imposing it.  The Supreme Court, for example, indicated that it 
would find unconstitutional death sentences for crimes other than 
murder.17  Moreover, the Court also banned the execution of the 
mentally ill18 and the execution of those under the age of sixteen at 
the time the crime was committed.19 
In Atkins v. Virginia,20 the trend toward public understanding and 
acceptance of the mentally retarded and the movement to limit the 
 
 14 Id. at 510.  First-degree murder is defined as “murder that is willful, deliberate, 
or premeditated, or that is committed during the course of another serious felony.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999). 
 15 In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court placed a moratorium on the 
death penalty, finding that then existing state systems for imposing the death penalty 
were arbitrary and capricious.  408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).  Following Furman, most 
states enacted new laws to ensure fair and rational imposition of death sentences.  See 
KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 512-15.  These new state laws followed a scheme of “guided 
discretion” during the penalty phase that required the trier of fact to weigh certain 
aggravating factors against any mitigating factors.  Id. 
 16 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).  In Gregg, the Supreme Court 
examined the new “guided discretion” schemes and concluded that these statutes 
solved the problems identified in Furman.  Id.  The death penalty was restored, and in 
1976 Gary Gilmore became the first person to be executed under the new death 
penalty statutes.  MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART xi (1993). 
 17 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (holding that the death 
penalty is excessive punishment for an offender who had not taken, attempted to 
take, or intended to take a life); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) 
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape is 
unconstitutional). 
 18 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally ill). 
 19 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).  In Thompson, a plurality 
consisting of Justices Steven, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun found that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of individuals who were under the age 
of sixteen at the time the crime was committed.  Id. at 838.  Justice O’Connor 
concurred in the decision.  Id. at 848 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor 
felt that although it was likely that there was a national consensus forbidding the 
execution of offenders whose crimes were committed before the age of sixteen, the 
evidence before the Court was not sufficient to establish such a consensus.  Id. at 855 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Instead, Justice O’Connor felt that the present statute 
was unconstitutional because the failure of the legislation to adopt a minimum age 
did not show the special care and deliberation required under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Id. at 858-59 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 20 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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use of the death penalty converged.  On September 25, 2001, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether the execution 
of the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment.21  Applying 
the “evolving standards of decency test,”22 the Court considered the 
significant number of states that have banned the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders, the views of professional and religious 
organizations, and opinion poll results before concluding that the 
execution of the mentally retarded constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”23  The Court, however, chose not to adopt a uniform 
definition of mental retardation.24  Instead, the Court left the task of 
defining mental retardation to the states.25 
Currently, numerous statutory and organizational definitions for 
mental retardation exist.26  Although most definitions have similar 
features, variability among statutory definitions is so great that it can 
result in one state classifying a defendant as mentally retarded while 
others do not.27  Further, while the use of valid and reliable 
psychological testing measures is a central feature of the professional 
organizational definitions of mental retardation, few statutory 
definitions mandate the use of these readily available testing 
methods.28  To avoid variability among the states and to ensure the 
proper identification of mentally retarded defendants, states should 
adopt both a uniform definition of mental retardation and uniform 
methods for assessment.  Accordingly, state legislatures should adopt 
the American Association of Mental Retardation’s (the “AAMR”) 
current definition for mental retardation and require that all 
assessments include the use of both a full-scale standardized 
intelligence test and a measurement designed to evaluate adaptive 
functioning. 
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s ban on the 
execution of mentally retarded defendants, as well as the problems 
created by the Court’s failure to adopt a uniform standard for 
determining mental retardation.  Part I.A of this Comment reviews 
 
 21 Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001).  In 1989, the Supreme Court had 
previously considered this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  In Penry, 
the Court found that there was no national consensus against executing the mentally 
retarded and thus held that the practice did not violate the Constitution.  Id. at 334. 
 22 See infra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
 23 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21. 
 24 Id. at 317. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See infra PART II. 
 27 See infra PART II.A. 
 28 Id. 
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the Supreme Court’s opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh,29 which found no 
constitutional barriers to the execution of the mentally retarded.30  
Part I.B discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. 
Virginia,31 which found that it is now “cruel and unusual punishment” 
to execute a mentally retarded defendant.32  Part II surveys the 
various statutory and professional definitions of mental retardation.  
Part III discusses the numerous methods for assessing mental 
retardation.  Specifically, Part III.A will look at various intelligence 
tests, and Part III.B will examine the testing of adaptive functioning.  
Part IV analyzes the problems and uncertainty created by the lack of a 
uniform standard and guidelines for assessment of mental 
retardation.  Finally, Part V concludes that the states should adopt a 
uniform definition of mental retardation and place guidelines on the 
method of assessment to avoid the erroneous execution of mentally 
retarded criminal defendants.33  Specifically, this part proposes that 
state legislators adopt the current AAMR definition for mental 
retardation and impose a statutory requirement that all evaluations 
utilize both a full-scale, standardized intelligence test and a diagnostic 
test designed to measure adaptive behaviors. 
I.  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”34  The Supreme Court has clearly established that this 
amendment prohibits the use of punishments considered cruel and 
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted.35  Based on these 
criteria, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty does not 
 
 29 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 30 Id. at 335. 
 31 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 32 Id. at 321. 
 33 The scope of this Comment is limited to the problems associated with the 
failure to identify those individuals who are mentally retarded and therefore should 
not be eligible for a death sentence.  The issue of faking mental retardation is an 
entirely different and separate issue that will not be addressed.  It should be noted 
that many experts do not believe that defendants will be readily able to fake mental 
retardation because most definitions require a history of limited intelligence and 
problems in adaptive functions relating back to childhood.  See, e.g., Emily Heller, 
Faking Retardation Isn’t Likely, NAT’L L.J. (Jun. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.law.com (on file with author). 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
 35 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (finding that “there is now little 
room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment 
embraces, at a minimum, those  modes or acts of punishment that had been 
considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted”). 
 778 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:773 
constitute a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.36  In Gregg, the 
Court noted, “the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of 
murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States 
and in England.”37 
The constraints of the Eighth Amendment are not limited, 
however, solely to those practices abhorred at common law.38  In Trop 
v. Dulles,39 Chief Justice Warren wrote that “the Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”40  Under this evolving standards 
of decency test, a practice is unconstitutional if it violates society’s 
current prevailing standards of decency.41  This test has been refined 
to require that the court make an assessment of contemporary values 
based upon objective indicia that reflect the public opinion.42  
Defendants have successfully used this test to challenge the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes other than murder,43 and 
when the defendants are mentally ill44 or are younger than sixteen at 
the time the crime was committed.45 
Attorneys have also used the evolving standards of decency test 
to challenge the imposition of a death sentence on mentally retarded 
offenders.  In 1989, attorneys for John Paul Penry unsuccessfully 
argued that the execution of the mentally retarded violated then 
existing standards of decency.46  Eleven years later the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Atkins v. Virginia47 to revisit this same issue.48  
Recognizing a shift in public opinion as evidenced by the enactment 
of many laws prohibiting a capital sentence for a mentally retarded 
defendant, the Supreme Court found that contemporary values had 
evolved to the point where the execution of the mentally retarded 
would violate the Eighth Amendment.49 
 
 36 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 37 Id. at 176. 
 38 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. 
 39 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 40 Id. at 101. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
 43 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 789 (1982). 
 44 See, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 399. 
 45 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 46 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 
 47 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 48 Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001). 
 49 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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A.  Penry v. Lynaugh 
John Paul Penry was twenty-two years old with mild-to-moderate 
retardation when he killed Pamela Carpenter.50  On October 25, 
1979, Penry entered Carpenter’s home intending to rape her.51  A 
struggle ensued, and the victim superficially wounded Penry with a 
pair of scissors.52  Enraged, Penry raped, beat, and stabbed the victim 
with the scissors.53  Although mortally wounded, Pamela Carpenter 
survived long enough to describe her assailant to the local sheriff’s 
deputies.54  Based upon the victim’s description, the police suspected 
Penry, a recent parolee who had served time for rape.55  During 
questioning, Penry confessed twice, and the police subsequently 
charged him with capital murder.56 
Penry’s retardation originated from organic brain damage that 
occurred during and after his breech birth.57  Severe abuse by his 
mother, including repeated vicious blows to his head, exacerbated his 
brain damage.58  He quit school during the first grade and did not 
learn to print his name until he was thirteen.59  During childhood, IQ 
tests placed Penry’s IQ somewhere between fifty and sixty, which 
corresponds to mild-to-moderate retardation.60 
Before trial, Penry notified the court of his intention to raise an 
insanity defense and filed a motion requesting a competency 
hearing.61  At the competency hearing, the defense called Dr. Jerome 
Brown, a clinical psychologist, to testify as to Penry’s mental 
retardation.62  He testified that his evaluation revealed Penry to have 
 
 50 EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS 
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 1-2 (1993). 
 51 Id. at 2. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 REED, supra note 50, at 1-2. 
 58 Id. Penry’s mother almost died giving birth to him and suffered a nervous 
breakdown from the trauma.  Id.  As a result, she was committed to a mental hospital 
for ten months.  Id.  Upon her release, she returned home and began severely 
abusing the child she blamed for her problems.  Id.  Over a ten year period, Penry 
was burned with cigarettes, had his arm broken several times, was locked in his room 
for long periods of time, and was forced to consume his own feces and urine.  Id. 
 59 REED, supra note 50, at 1-2. 
 60 Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08. 
 61 Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 650 (Tex. App. 1985). 
 62 Id. 
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an IQ of fifty-four.63  Further, Dr. Brown stated that Penry had the 
mental age of a six and a half year old and the social functioning of a 
nine or ten year old.64  Nevertheless, “the jury found Penry competent 
to stand trial.”65 
During the guilt phase of the trial, Penry introduced an insanity 
defense and called Dr. Jose Garcia to testify on his behalf.66  Dr. 
Garcia’s testimony indicated that Penry suffered from moderate 
retardation and organic brain damage that either was caused at birth 
or was the result of severe head trauma at an early age.67  The doctor 
testified that this made it “impossible for [Penry] to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.”68  
Penry’s mother testified that he was unable to learn at school, and his 
sister testified to the abuse he suffered at the hands of his mother.69 
In response to Penry’s asserted insanity defense, the State 
introduced two psychiatrists to rebut Dr. Garcia’s testimony.70  Dr. 
Kenneth Vogtberger testified that Penry had the characteristics of 
antisocial personality71 and that his low IQ scores underestimated his 
ability to function.72  Dr. Felix Peebles agreed with Dr. Vogtberger’s 
assessment and testified that he had diagnosed Penry with mental 
retardation in both 1973 and 1977.73  Both of the State’s experts 
testified that Penry “was a person of extremely limited mental 
ability.”74 
The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Penry guilty of 
capital murder.75  During the penalty phase of the trial, the State 
again called Dr. Peebles and Dr. Vogtberger to testify.76  This time 
they asserted that should Penry ever be released he posed a high risk 
 
 63 Penry, 492 U.S. at 308. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Penry, 492 U.S. at 309. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines Antisocial 
Personality Disorder as “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the 
rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into 
adulthood.”  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 706 (4th text rev. 2000).  Individuals with this 
disorder are commonly called psychopaths or sociopaths.  Id. 
 72 Penry, 492 U.S. at 309. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 310. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d at 651. 
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of future dangerousness and would be “a continuing threat to 
society.”77  Penry’s attorneys “reoffered ‘all of the evidence heretofore 
given . . . by the witnesses . . .’” and argued that the jury should 
consider Penry’s mental retardation in assessing punishment.78  
Nevertheless, the jury sentenced Penry to death.79 
Penry filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas challenging his sentence.80  
After the district court denied Penry relief, he subsequently appealed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.81  The 
circuit court affirmed the decision of the lower court.82  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.83 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Penry, 492 U.S. at 310.  Under the Texas Penal Code at the time of Penry’s trial, 
the jury decided whether or not a defendant would be sentenced to death 
depending upon their answers to three questions.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 
(Vernon 1974).  Under Article 37.071 (b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
the jury was asked the following questions: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the 
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, 
if any, by the deceased? 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981).  If the jury answered all 
three of the questions in the affirmative, then the trial court was required to 
sentence the defendant to death.  Id. at art. 37.071(c)-(e). 
 80 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987); Penry, 492 U.S. at 312.  In part, 
Penry argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial 
court did not instruct the jury on how they should consider mitigating circumstances 
and also because the execution of the mentally retarded constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Id. 
 81 Penry, 492 U.S. at 312. 
 82 Id.  Although the Court of Appeals questioned whether Penry was given the 
individualized sentencing required by the Constitution, they ultimately decided that 
lack of a mitigating instruction did not constitute reversible error.  Id.  The court also 
rejected the argument that the execution of the mentally retarded qualified as cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Id. at 313. 
 83 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313.  The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to decide 
whether Penry’s constitutional rights had been violated by the absence of a 
mitigating instruction to the jury.  Id.  On this issue, a majority consisting of Justices 
O’Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens found that the jury was not 
able to adequately consider all of the mitigating evidence due to both the lack of a 
mitigating instruction and the use of special issues to determine whether to impose 
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Before the Court, Penry argued that individuals with mental 
retardation are not capable of the moral culpability required to justify 
the imposition of a death sentence.84  Further, he argued that there 
was “an emerging national consensus against executing the mentally 
retarded.”85 
A majority of the Court consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, White, Scalia, and Kennedy addressed the issue of 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.86  The 
Court noted that the Eighth Amendment applies to both those 
punishments prohibited at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted 
and those punishments prohibited by contemporary values.87  The 
Court further noted that to determine the evolving standards of 
decency it must look to objective evidence, including enacted 
legislation.88 
The majority acknowledged a common law prohibition against 
punishing “idiots” for criminal acts that has evolved into the present 
day insanity defense.89  The Court found that to qualify as “idiots” at 
common law, defendants would have had to show a complete lack of 
“capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.”90  The 
majority, however, did not find any common law prohibition on 
executing mentally retarded defendants, such as Penry, who knew 
that their conduct was wrong and chose not to conform their 
behavior to the law.91 
 
the death penalty.  Id.  Based on this part of the decision, Penry’s sentence was 
invalidated because the Court felt that the jury did not have any way in which they 
could consider Penry’s mental retardation as a potential mitigating factor.  Id. 
 84 Id. at 328-29. 
 85 Id. at 329. 
 86 Penry, 492 U.S. at 306, 330-31.  In a convoluted decision, Justice O’Connor 
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and IV-A, and 
the opinion of the court with respect to Parts II-A, II-B, III, and IV-B. Id. at 306.  Parts 
II-B and III were joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.  Id.  
Parts II-A and IV-B were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, 
and Kennedy.  Id.  Part IV-C is solely the opinion of Justice O’Connor.  Id.  Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.  Id.  Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part that was joined by Justice Blackmun.  Penry, 492 U.S. at 306.  Justice 
Scalia also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy.  Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 329.  The Court stated that “the clearest and most reliable objective 
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.”  Id. 
 89 Id. at 332. 
 90 Id. at 333. 
 91 Penry, 492 U.S. at 333. 
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The majority next rejected Penry’s argument that there was a 
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded.92  Noting 
that only two states and the federal government had statutes banning 
such executions, the Court found insufficient evidence to support the 
existence of a national consensus.93  The Court also rejected public 
opinion polls supporting Penry’s argument, finding that they 
provided insufficient evidence of contemporary values.94 
In a concurrence, Justice O’Connor stated that the courts should 
consider individualized personal responsibility and not just the 
presence of mental retardation when determining eligibility for the 
death penalty.95  The Justice found that mental retardation should be 
only one factor considered in determining culpability.96 
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed 
with Penry’s argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
execution of the mentally retarded.97  The Justice contended that “the 
impairment of a mentally retarded offender’s reasoning abilities, 
control over impulsive behavior, and moral development . . . limits 
his or her culpability,” thus making the death penalty 
disproportionate to the crime and, therefore, unconstitutional.98  
Further, the Justice found the execution of the mentally retarded was 
also unconstitutional because it does not contribute to the penal 
goals of deterrence and retribution.99 
 
 92 Id. at 333-34. 
 93 Id. at 334.  At the time of Penry, Georgia and Maryland were the only states that 
had statutes banning the execution of a person who is mentally retarded.  Id.  The 
federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also prohibited the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders.  Id. 
The Court contrasted this situation to that in Ford v. Wainwright, where the Court 
acknowledged there is a national consensus against executing mentally ill offenders, 
and to Thompson v. Oklahoma, where the Court found a national consensus against 
executing defendants who were younger than sixteen at the time they committed 
their crimes.  Id.  The Court noted that at the time of Ford no states allowed the 
execution of insane offenders and twenty-six states had statutes that suspended the 
execution of offenders who became insane following sentencing.  Penry, 492 U.S. at 
334 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)).  In Thompson, the 
Court noted that eighteen states expressly prohibited the execution of offenders 
younger than sixteen.  Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988)). 
 94 Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.  The Court noted that the sentiment expressed in those 
polls may ultimately be reflected in legislation and that such legislation would be a 
reliable indicator of contemporary values.  Id. 
 95 Id. at 338 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 96 Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 97 Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 98 Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 99 Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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B.  Legislative Response to Penry 
Following Penry, the legislative landscape underwent dramatic 
changes.100  In 1989, at the time of the Penry decision, only the federal 
government, Georgia, and Maryland had statutes prohibiting the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders.101  In the years that 
followed, fifteen states passed legislation prohibiting the death 
penalty for mentally disabled offenders.102  When one considers these 
eighteen states in conjunction with the twelve states that do not have 
the death penalty, more than half of the states have banned the 
execution of a mentally retarded offender.103 
In April of 1990, less than a year after Penry was decided, both 
Tennessee and Kentucky passed legislation to stop the executions of 
mentally retarded offenders.104  Arkansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Washington soon followed.105  In 1994 and 1995, Kansas and New 
York, respectively, re-instated the death penalty but specifically 
excluded the mentally retarded.106  By 2001, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota also banned the 
execution of the mentally retarded.107 
Much to the surprise of death penalty opponents, in March of 
2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of McCarver v. 
 
 100 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002). 
 101 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1988)); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002).  Maryland’s statute was enacted prior to Penry, 
but did not take effect until one week after the decision was handed down.  Penry, 
492 U.S. at 334. 
 102 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401(2) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-1 (Michie 2002); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002). 
 103 Lindsay Raphael, Note and Comment, Have American Standards of Decency 
Evolved to the Point Where Capital Punishment Inflicted upon the Mentally Retarded Can No 
Longer Be Tolerated, 26 NOVA L. REV. 269, 299 (2001). 
 104 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 
(1990). 
 105 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §16-9-401(2) 
(1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 
(1993). 
 106 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 
(McKinney 1995). 
 107 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT § 
28-105.01 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2000). 
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North Carolina108 to revisit the constitutionality of executing mentally 
retarded criminals.109  Ernest P. McCarver was convicted of first-
degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon and sentenced 
to death despite having an IQ of sixty-seven.110  However, before the 
Supreme Court could hear the McCarver case, it became moot when 
the North Carolina legislature passed a new statute prohibiting the 
execution of mentally retarded offenders.111  On September 25, 2001, 
the Supreme Court dismissed McCarver,112 and granted certiorari to 
address the same question in Atkins v. Virginia.113 
C.  Atkins v. Virginia 
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and William Jones 
kidnapped Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint, forced him to withdraw money 
from an ATM, and then shot him eight times.114  Atkins was convicted 
of capital murder, and the state argued for a death sentence based 
upon future dangerousness and the “vileness of the offense.”115 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense expert, Dr. 
Evan Nelson, testified that Atkins was mildly retarded with an IQ of 
fifty-nine.116  Dr. Nelson based his testimony on interviews with Atkins, 
his family, and jail personnel; an examination of school and court 
 
 108 533 U.S. 975 (2001). 
 109 Charles Lane, High Court to Review Executing Retarded; Decision May Reflect 
Changes in State Laws on Mentally Disabled, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2001, at A1.  
Opponents had been campaigning against imposing the death penalty on mentally 
retarded offenders, but did not believe the Court would revisit this issue again so 
soon after their 1989 ruling in Penry.  Id. 
 110 State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 31 (N.C. 1995). 
 111 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2001). 
 112 McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001). 
 113 Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001). 
 114 Frank Green, High Court to Tackle Execution Case; Arguments to Center on Mental 
Disability, THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2002, at A1; see also Frank Green, 
ATM Photos Identified Atkins, Jones; Victim Played Basketball, Ran Track and was Eagle 
Scout, THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2002, at A8. 
The state indicted both Atkins and Jones for capital murder, however, Jones 
made a deal to testify against Atkins in exchange for life imprisonment.  Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 308 n.1.  At Atkins’ trial, both Atkins and Jones testified that it was the other 
who actually shot and killed Nesbitt.  Id. at 307.  As one newspaper noted, when the 
jury was given a choice between believing Atkins, who “bumbled on the witness 
stand,” and Jones, who was smart enough not to talk to detectives and to cut a deal,  
Jones was the easy choice.  Sara Catania, Who Should Die, L.A. WKLY., June 28, 2002, at 
20. 
 115 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307-08.  To support these two aggravating factors, the State 
offered evidence of Atkins’ prior felony convictions, testimony from earlier victims, 
and pictures of Nesbitt’s body.  Id. at 308. 
 116 Id. at 308-09. 
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records; and the administration of a full-scale intelligence test.117  The 
psychologist explained that Atkins’ IQ score fell into the bottom one 
percent for intelligence and, in his opinion, Atkins always had limited 
intelligence and was not currently malingering.118  The State offered 
no rebuttal.119 
The jury sentenced Atkins to death,120 but because of problems 
with the verdict form, the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a new 
sentencing hearing.121  Dr. Nelson repeated his testimony at the new 
hearing and this time the State offered a rebuttal witness.122  Dr. 
Stanton Samenow testified that Atkins was not retarded, but instead 
suffered from antisocial personality disorder.123  The jury once again 
sentenced Atkins to death.124 
Based upon Penry, the Virginia courts upheld Atkins’ death 
sentence.125  Because of the “dramatic shift in the state legislative 
landscape,” the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
revisit the issue of the constitutionality of executing the mentally 
retarded.126 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began the decision by 
reviewing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment and the evolving standards of decency test.127  The 
majority concluded that, under this test, it must look at current 
legislation, representing the judgment of the citizens, when deciding 
this issue.128 
The majority found that the legislative landscape had 
 
 117 Id. at 309 n.4. 
 118 Id. at 309 n.5.  Dr. Nelson testified that he had conducted over forty forensic 
evaluations of capital defendants and Atkins was only the second defendant he had 
diagnosed with mental retardation.  Id.  Further, based upon his evaluation, he did 
not believe that the low IQ score was the result of malingering, an aberrational test 
score, or the result of an invalid test.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5. 
 119 Id. at 309. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.  Dr. Samenow’s evaluation was based upon two interviews with Atkins, 
interviews with jail personnel, and a review of school records.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 
n.6.  Dr. Samenow never administered an intelligence test.  Id.  His only testing 
consisted of asking Atkins several questions from an outdated version of an IQ test.  
Id.  Dr. Samenow attributed Atkins’ terrible academic performance to a failure to pay 
attention and a lack of motivation.  Id. 
 124 Id. at 309. 
 125 Id. at 310. 
 126 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001). 
 127 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12. 
 128 Id. at 312. 
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significantly changed since Penry.129  The Court noted that, based in 
part on national attention from their earlier decision, sixteen states 
had enacted legislation banning the execution of mentally retarded 
offenders and other states were considering similar legislation.130  The 
Court found significant the fact that this legislation was being 
approved during a time when anticrime legislation was greatly 
favored over legislation that protects people convicted of violent 
crimes.131  Further, the majority also noted that the practice of 
executing mentally retarded offenders is uncommon, even in those 
states authorizing such executions.132  Based upon these changes, the 
Court concluded that a national consensus against executing the 
mentally retarded had developed.133 
Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was disagreement 
regarding which offenders qualify as retarded.134  The Court, however, 
chose not to adopt a national standard for determining mental 
retardation.135  Instead, the Court preferred to ‘“leave to the States 
the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional 
restriction.’”136 
In addition to finding that the current standards of decency do 
not allow for the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court also 
found that death penalty jurisprudence provides two additional 
reasons to categorically ban the execution of the mentally retarded.137  
First, the Court found that these executions do not further the goals 
of retribution and deterrence, and consequently result in the 
‘“purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.’”138  
 
 129 Id. at 314-15. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 315-16. 
 132 Id. at 316. 
 133 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.  In a footnote, the Court noted that additional evidence 
shows that the change in legislation “reflects a much broader social and professional 
consensus.”  Id. at 316 n.21.  Amici Curiae Briefs submitted in this case showed that 
the American Psychological Association, the American Association of Mental 
Retardation, diverse religious communities, and the world community all opposed 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders.  Id. 
 134 Id. at 317. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
 137 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19. 
 138 Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).  The Court 
noted that previously in Gregg v. Georgia, they found that the death penalty was 
justified by the social purposes of retribution and deterrence.  Id. at 318-19 (citing 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).  The Court found that “the lesser 
culpability of the mentally retarded offender . . . does not merit that form of 
retribution.”  Id. at 319.  The Court also found that the diminished capacity of 
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Second, the Court recognized that offenders with reduced capacities 
have an increased risk of unjustifiably receiving the death penalty.139  
Consequently, although the Court refused to define mental 
retardation, it found that once a determination of mental retardation 
was made, execution would be cruel and unusual punishment under 
the “evolving standards of decency” test.140 
In blistering dissents, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia criticized the majority’s finding of a national consensus against 
executing the mentally retarded.141  The dissenters accused the 
majority of assessing the legislation in such a manner as to create a 
post hoc rationalization for the decision.142  Further, the dissenters 
heavily criticized the majority’s use of public opinion polls, and the 
opinions of professional organizations and religious groups to 
support its analysis of contemporary social values.143  Instead, the 
dissenters argued that the Court’s inquiry should be limited to 
legislation and the practices of sentencing juries.144  These factors, the 
dissenters argued, do not provide sufficient evidence to support a 
national consensus against imposing the death penalty on mentally 
retarded offenders.145 
II.  MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 
Although the Supreme Court banned the execution of the 
mentally retarded in Atkins, it chose not to define mental 
retardation.146  Instead, the Court left it to the states to define 
 
mentally retarded defendants makes it unlikely that the possibility of receiving the 
death penalty would be understood and act as a deterrent.  Id. at 319-20. 
 139 Id. at 320-21.  Among the possibilities acknowledged by the Court are the 
increased risk of false confessions, the fact that mentally retarded defendants are 
unlikely to be able to assist their attorneys and make poor witnesses, and the fact that 
a finding of mental retardation may enhance the likelihood of a jury believing in the 
defendant’s future dangerousness.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. 
 140 Id. at 321. 
 141 Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-45 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 143 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 347 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 
‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal . . . to the views of assorted professional 
and religious organizations, members of the so-called ‘world community,’ and 
respondents to opinion polls”). 
 144 Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-48 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 145 Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 341-48 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 146 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
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retardation for themselves.147  A survey of current state definitions 
shows the problems with this approach.  There is no uniformity in the 
states’ current definitions of mental retardation, and consequently, 
someone who is legally retarded in one state may not be in another.148 
A.  Statutory Definitions 
1.  IQ Below Sixty-five 
Statutes in both Arizona and Arkansas define mental retardation 
as an IQ below sixty-five and “significant” impairment in adaptive 
behavior.149  There are, however, considerable differences between 
these two statutes.150  The Arizona statute defines mental retardation 
as “a condition based on a mental deficit that involves significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently 
with significant limitations in adaptive functions” with an onset 
before the age of eighteen.151  Under this statute, courts hearing 
capital cases must appoint a licensed psychologist to conduct a 
prescreening evaluation of the defendant’s intelligence.152  If the pre-
screening evaluation finds an IQ of seventy-five or less, the defendant 
is then tested by additional experts nominated by both the State and 
the defense.153  A finding that the defendant has an IQ of sixty-five or 
lower establishes a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is 
retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty.154  In 
addition, if a defendant has an IQ of seventy or lower, he is permitted 
to establish mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.155 
By comparison, Arkansas defines mental retardation as both 
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning 
accompanied by significant deficits or impairments in adaptive 
functioning” that is apparent by the age of eighteen and “deficits in 
adaptive behavior.”156  There is a rebuttable presumption that those 
defendants with an IQ of sixty-five or below are retarded, and 
therefore ineligible for a death sentence.157  Under Arkansas law, 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 See infra PART II.A. 
 149 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001). 
 150 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001). 
 151 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(K)(2) (2001). 
 152 Id. § 13-703.02(B)(2001). 
 153 Id. § 13-703.02(D) (2001). 
 154 Id. § 13-703.02(A), (G) (2001). 
 155 Id. § 13-703.02(G) (2001). 
 156 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(1) (Michie 2001). 
 157 Id. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie 2001). 
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however, the state is not required to assess the intelligence of capital 
defendants—the burden is on the defendant to prove mental 
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.158 
2.  IQ Below Seventy 
Several states have set seventy, rather than sixty-five, as the 
minimum IQ for the imposition of a death sentence.159  However, the 
level of impairment in adaptive behavior required for a 
determination of mental retardation varies amongst these states.160  
Moreover, some states limit when these deficits must have become 
apparent,161 while others impose no age requirement for when the 
impairments must manifest.162 
Kentucky does not allow for the execution of offenders with 
“significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” and “substantial 
deficits in adaptive behavior,” both of which must have manifested 
during the “developmental period.”163  While the statute defines 
significantly subaverage intelligence as an IQ of seventy or less,164 
there is no explanation as to what constitutes a substantial deficit, or 
at what age the developmental period ends.165 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee all 
prohibit the execution of a defendant with subaverage intellectual 
functioning, as evidenced by an IQ of seventy or below on a 
standardized intelligence test,166 and by deficits in adaptive 
 
 158 Id. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2001); see also id. § 5-4-618(c) (Michie 2001). 
 159 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-
202(1) (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 
(Michie 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-
26.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.95.030 (2002). 
 160 For example, Kentucky requires “substantial deficits” in adaptive behavior, 
while Nebraska and New Mexico only require the existence of deficits in adaptive 
behavior.  Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (2001), with 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002). 
 161 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001). 
 162 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 
(Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002). 
 163 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (2001).  In general, the developmental 
period is defined as the time between birth and adulthood.  See ROBERT J. GREGORY, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 232 (3d ed. 2000).  There is some variation among 
definitions as to what age constitutes the end of the developmental period.  See infra 
PARTS II.B-D. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 An intelligence test is considered standardized when there is a uniform 
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functioning.167  These states also require that the mental retardation 
manifest before a certain age.168  In South Dakota, North Carolina, 
and Tennessee there must be evidence that the deficits in 
intelligence and adaptive functioning manifested before the age of 
eighteen.169  Maryland, however, requires the manifestation of deficits 
to occur before the age of twenty-two.170  Consequently, if 
hypothetical-defendant Sal’s deficits manifested at the age of 
nineteen, he would be considered mentally retarded in Maryland, but 
not in North Carolina, South Dakota, or Tennessee. 
When other states are included in the comparison, the disparity 
becomes even more apparent.  Nebraska, New Mexico, and 
Washington also prohibit the execution of defendants with 
subaverage intelligence and deficits in adaptive functioning as 
evidenced by a score of seventy or less on a reliable intelligence test.171  
The legislators in Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington, however, 
chose not to set an age limit for the manifestation of these deficits.172  
Therefore, Sal, whose deficits manifested at the age of nineteen, 
would also be considered retarded in Nebraska, New Mexico, and 
Washington.  Further, if Sal had an IQ of sixty-five and deficits did 
not manifest until the age of twenty-three, he could be executed in 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee, but not in 
Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington. 
3.  No Minimum IQ 
In addition to those state statutes that include an IQ score as 
part of their definition of mental retardation, many other states 
choose not to set a minimum statutory IQ.  Instead, these statutes 
provide definitions that describe those deficits that qualify as mentally 
 
method of test administration.  See GREGORY, supra note 163, at 30-31.  
Standardization is important  because it eliminates differences amongst different 
examiners and settings.  Id.  Generally, standardized tests have specific directions 
governing administration, including the methods of administration, timing, and the 
proper responses to any questions posed by the test taker.  Id. 
 167 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
203 (2001). 
 168 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002). 
 169 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 
(2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2001). 
 170 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(1) (2002). 
 171 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 
2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002). 
 172 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 
2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002). 
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retarded for each state.173  The statutory definitions range from the 
standard requirement of subaverage intelligence and deficits in 
adaptive behavior174 to Kansas’ definition, which requires an inability 
to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct.175 
In Colorado, Georgia, and Indiana, the statutory definition of 
mental retardation requires significantly subaverage intelligence that 
exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive functioning.176  Colorado 
requires these requirements to manifest and be documented during 
the developmental period, which the statute does not define.177  It 
does, however, allow the courts to waive the documentation 
requirement “upon a finding that extraordinary circumstances 
exist.”178  The Georgia statute has the same manifestation 
requirements but does not require any documentation showing that 
the deficits manifested during the developmental period.179  By 
comparison, Indiana requires that a court ordered evaluation finds 
the manifestation occurred before the age of twenty-two.180 
The definitions of mental retardation in Connecticut, Florida, 
and Missouri are similar, but their statutes provide different 
definitions for some of the terms used to define mental retardation.181  
Connecticut defines subaverage intelligence as “an intelligence 
quotient more than two standard deviations below the mean for the 
test,” and requires that the test be a standardized intelligence test 
administered by a person with formal training in its administration.182  
The Connecticut statute then defines adaptive behavior as the 
“degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal 
independence and social responsibility expected for the individual’s 
age and cultural group,” and the developmental period as the time 
 
 173 See, e.g, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g 
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2001); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002). 
 174 See, e.g, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g 
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001); N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002). 
 175 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2001). 
 176 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002). 
 177 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2002). 
 178 Id. 
 179 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002). 
 180 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 2002). 
 181 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001). 
 182 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001). 
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from birth to eighteen years of age.183  Florida’s statute is almost 
identical, but does not specify who may administer the test to a 
defendant.184  Missouri does not specify what qualifies as subaverage 
intellectual functioning, but requires “limitations in two or more 
adaptive behaviors” defined as “communication, self-care, home 
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, 
functional academics, leisure and work” that manifest before the age 
of eighteen.185 
The definition of mental retardation in the Kansas statute is 
quite different from all others.186  Kansas defines mental retardation 
as subaverage intelligence “to an extent which substantially impairs 
one’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to 
conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law.”187  Therefore, in 
Kansas, unlike all other states, a mentally retarded offender can be 
executed unless, as the result of his mental deficiencies, he cannot 
understand the criminality of his behavior or conform his behavior to 
the law.188 
B.  The American Association on Mental Retardation’s Definition 
In addition to the various state statutory definitions of mental 
retardation, several professional organizations also define mental 
retardation.  The American Association on Mental Retardation (the 
“AAMR”) is an interdisciplinary organization of professionals that 
focuses on mental retardation.189  Founded in 1876, the AAMR has 
defined mental retardation since 1921.190  The AAMR continually 
 
 183 Id. 
 184 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002). 
 185 MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2001). 
 186 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2001). 
 187 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2001). 
 188 Id. 
 189 American Association of Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation, 
available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter AAMR 2002]. 
 190 Id.  Originally, the organization was entitled “The Association of Medical 
Officers of American Institutions of Idiotic and Feeble-minded Children.”  James W. 
Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 414, 421 n.39 (1985).  In 1906, the name of the association was changed to “The 
American Association for the Study of the Feeble-minded,” and in 1933 the name 
“The American Association on Mental Deficiency” was adopted. Id.  By 1992, the 
organization was known by its present name.  See generally James W. Ellis, MENTAL 
RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A GUIDE TO STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 6, 
available at www.aamr.org/Reading_Room/pdf/state_legislatures_guide.pdf (citing 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992)) (last 
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revises its definition, and published its latest comprehensive update 
in 2002.191 
Currently, the AAMR defines mental retardation as “a disability 
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual 
functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, 
social, and practical adaptive skills,” which manifests before the age of 
eighteen.192  When determining mental retardation, professionals 
must abide by the following guidelines: 
1. Evaluate limitations in present functioning within the context 
of the individual’s age peers and culture; 
2. Take into account the individual’s cultural and linguistic 
differences as well as communication, sensory, motor, and 
behavioral factors; 
3. Recognize that within an individual limitations often coexist 
with strengths; 
4. Describe limitations so that an individualized plan of needed 
supports can be developed; and 
5. Provide appropriate personalized supports to improve the 
functioning of a person with mental retardation.193 
The AAMR’s intelligence criterion for diagnosing mental retardation 
is an IQ score of approximately seventy or below.194  Based on the 
standard of error that exists for most intelligence tests, however, the 
AAMR makes an IQ of seventy-five the cutoff for a diagnosis of 
mental retardation.195 
 
visited Mar. 27, 2003) (on file with author). 
 191 AAMR 2002, supra note 189. 
In 1983, the AAMR definition of mental retardation was “significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in 
adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.”  AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 
(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 8th ed. 1983) [hereinafter AAMR 1983]. 
In 1992, the AAMR defined mental retardation as: 
substantial limitations in present functioning.  It is characterized by 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently 
with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable 
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, 
leisure, and work.  Mental retardation manifests before age 18. 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter AAMR 1992]. 
 192 AAMR 2002, supra note 189. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
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Adaptive behavior is defined by the AAMR as “the collection of 
conceptual, social, and practical skills,” which allow people to 
function in their everyday lives.196  The AAMR recommends that 
limitations in adaptive behavior be assessed by using standardized 
testing, and defines significant limitations as a score that is two or 
more standard deviations below the average either on a conceptual, 
social, or practical sub-test, or on the overall test.197 
The focus of the AAMR definition is on evaluating mental 
retardation in order to develop an individualized support plan.198  
Supports are the “resources and individual strategies necessary to 
promote the development, education, interests, and personal well-
being” of those with mental retardation.199  The AAMR definition is 
based on a premise that the assessment is designed to allow the 
professional to consider the individual’s limitations in order to create 
and implement an appropriate treatment plan.200  The definition was 
not created for classification purposes, but rather is part of a model 
meant to help each mentally disabled individual function to the best 
of his or her ability.201 
C.  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Definition 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the 
“DSM-IV-TR”) is a uniform and standardized system for the 
classification and diagnosis of mental disorders.202  The DSM-IV-TR, 
published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the definitive 
diagnostic tool for psychologists and psychiatrists.203  Its classifications 
are based on a systematic, empirical study of literature reviews, data 
analysis, and field trials.204  The diagnostic criteria, categories, and 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 AAMR 2002, supra note 189. 
 199 Id.  Support areas include providing activities focusing on “human 
development, teaching and education, home living, community living, employment, 
health and safety, behavior, sociability, and protection and advocacy.”  Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS xviii-xxvi (4th text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 203 ROBERT C. CARSON ET AL., ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 8-9 (10th 
ed. 1998).  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the “gold 
standard” for defining mental disorder.  Id.; see also GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. 
NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 59 (6th ed. 1994) (referring to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as the “current, official diagnostic system 
widely employed by mental health professionals”). 
 204 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at xxvi-xxx. 
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descriptions are meant to be used for classification by those 
individuals with appropriate clinical training and diagnostic 
experience.205 
Based upon the 1992 AAMR definition,206 the DSM-IV-TR 
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation are: 
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ 
test . . . . 
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive 
functioning, . . . in at least two of the following areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, 
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic 
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. 
C.  The onset is before age 18 years.207 
The DSM-IV-TR advises that, based upon the measurement error 
inherent in all testing instruments, an individual whose IQ is between 
seventy and seventy-five would still qualify as mentally retarded if he 
or she also exhibited significant deficits in adaptive behavior.208  
Conversely, regardless of a low IQ score, mental retardation should 
not be diagnosed in individuals without deficits in adaptive 
behavior.209 
The DSM-IV-TR defines adaptive functioning as the effectiveness 
with which an individual can cope with the demands of everyday life 
and how he compares to the standards of personal independence 
expected in someone of a comparable age, socio-cultural 
background, and community.210  The Manual calls for evidence of 
adaptive functioning to be gathered from reliable independent 
sources.211  Further, the DSM-IV-TR recommends the administration 
of one of the available commercial tests used to assess an individual’s 
adaptive functioning.212 
D.  American Psychological Association’s Definition 
The American Psychological Association (the “APA”) defines 
 
 205 Id. at xxiv-xxvii. 
 206 See sources cited supra note 191. 
 207 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49. 
 208 Id. at 41-42. 
 209 Id. at 42. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id.  Examples of reliable independent sources include teacher evaluations, and 
school and medical histories.  Id. 
 212 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 42. 
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mental retardation as “(a) significant limitations in general 
intellectual functioning; (b) significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning which exist concurrently; and (c) onset of intellectual 
and adaptive limitations before the age of 22 years.”213  The APA notes 
that this definition is essentially analogous with the current DSM-IV-
TR definition and with an earlier AAMR definition.214 
The APA definition instructs that “significant limitations in 
intellectual functioning” should be determined based upon a score 
that is two or more standard deviations below the mean on a valid 
and “comprehensive, individual measure of intelligence that is 
administered in a standardized format and interpreted by a qualified 
practitioner.”215  Similarly, “significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning” should be determined through the use of “a valid and 
comprehensive, individual measure of adaptive behavior.”216  A 
diagnosis of mental retardation requires that these limitations 
originate before the age of twenty-two.217  The APA stresses that all 
three of these criteria must be met before an individual can be 
diagnosed with mental retardation.218 
III.  METHODS OF ASSESSING MENTAL RETARDATION 
Mental retardation assessments generally are conducted by 
trained individuals, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social 
workers, and involve both the use of appropriate psychological tests 
and in-depth clinical evaluations.219  The majority of these assessments 
are conducted on children for identification and evaluation of 
mental retardation.220  In death penalty cases, however, the evaluation 
of adult criminal defendants is conducted for use in the legal 
system.221 
 
 213 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (John W. Jacobson & James A. 
Mulick eds., 1996) [hereinafter APA]. 
 214 Id. at 2. 
 215 Id. at 13. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 14. 
 219 See APA, supra note 213, at 113. 
 220 See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at xviii-xxvi (categorizing mental 
retardation as a “Disorder Usually First Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or 
Adolescence”); JEROME SATTLER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN 651 (3d ed. 1992) 
(discussing the importance of evaluating mentally retarded children so that 
appropriate remedial action can be taken). 
 221 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 307-09 (1989). 
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In general, psychological testing consists of following a 
standardized procedure to sample and categorize behavior.222  
Although the formats of these tests vary widely, most use standardized 
testing procedures and defined scoring methods and, generally, 
results are determined by comparing the test taker’s scores against 
existing norms or standards.223  Most psychological tests are released 
only to qualified persons because an erroneous score from an 
unqualified examiner can cause harm, the previewing of test 
questions renders the test invalid, and the leaking of the test’s 
content to the general public would destroy the test’s effectiveness.224 
A.  Intelligence Testing 
Historically, individual intelligence tests measured a broad range 
of skills in order to estimate a person’s general intelligence.225  
Modern intelligence tests have continued to assess intelligence by 
testing a wide variety of skills.226  Most modern intelligence tests 
consist of numerous subtests from which the subject’s overall 
intelligence score is ultimately derived.227  The most common full-
scale, standardized intelligence tests used to assess individual adult 
intelligence levels are the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-III and 
the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition.228 
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (the “WAIS-III”) is one 
of the most widely used individualized intelligence tests.229  The test 
uses fourteen subtests to assess Full-Scale, Verbal, and Performance 
Intelligence.230  Scores on the individual subtests are converted into 
 
 222 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 30-32. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 39-40. 
 225 Id. at 30-32. 
 226 Id. at 34. 
 227 Id. 
 228 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 177. 
 229 ROGER PIERANGELO & GEORGE GIULIANI, SPECIAL EDUCATOR’S COMPLETE GUIDE 
TO 109 DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 32 (1998). 
 230 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 187.  Full Scale IQ is an individual’s overall score 
on the WAIS-III.  See id.  Although there are fourteen subtests, object assembly has 
become optional and is only used if necessary to replace another subtest.  Id. at 187.  
Of the thirteen main subtests, eleven must be completed in order to compute the 
subject’s Full Scale IQ.  Id. 
Verbal IQ analyzes “auditory input and vocal output.”  PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, 
supra note 229, at 32.  The subtests for computation of Verbal IQ are Vocabulary, 
Similarities, Arithmetic, Digit Span, Information, and Comprehension.  Id. at 32-33.  
These subtests measure numerous abilities including attention, concentration, 
learning ability, reasoning skills, and memory.  Id. 
Performance IQ refers to an individual’s ability to perform tasks that measure 
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scaled scores, averaged, and then converted into an IQ score.231  The 
subject’s IQ score is normed based upon a mean IQ score of one 
hundred with a standard deviation of fifteen points.232  Representing 
only 2.2% of the population, an individual whose IQ score is below 
seventy is considered Intellectually Deficient.233 
The WAIS-III was standardized on a large sample of adults 
carefully stratified to match the population figures from the 1995 
United States Census.234  The test has exceptional reliability235 and 
validity.236  Other strengths of the WAIS-III are that its scores highly 
correlate with academic achievement and the test is “well organized 
and easy to use.”237  Some experts, however, have criticized the WAIS-
III, arguing that some questions have a cultural bias and, below an IQ 
of forty, the test does not provide distinguishable levels of 
retardation.238 
In constrast, the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition (the “SB:FE”) is 
 
“visual input and vocal or motoric output.”  Id. at 32.  The Performance IQ subtests 
are Picture Completion, Digit Symbol-Coding, Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, and 
Picture Arrangement.  Id. at 33.  Some of the abilities measured by these subtests are 
visual perception, visual discrimination, attention to detail, and speed in learning 
tasks.  Id. 
 231 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 109. 
 232 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 187-88.  IQ scores obtained on the WAIS-III are 
classified as follows: 
IQ Range Classification Percent Included 
130 and over Very Superior 2.2 
120-129 Superior 6.7 
110-119 High Average 16.1 
90-109 Average 50.0 
80-89 Low Average 16.1 
70-79 Borderline 6.7 
69 and below Intellectually Deficient 2.2 
PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 109. 
 233 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 34.  The WAIS-III category of 
Intellectually Deficient refers to anyone scoring below a score of seventy on the test.  
Id.  An individual scoring in that category has “significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning.”  See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 41. 
 234 GREGORY, supra note 222, at 188.  The sample, consisting of 2,450 adults, was 
carefully stratified on the variables of race, sex, education, and geographic region.  
Id. 
 235 Id. at 189; see also PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 47.  Reliability is a 
measure of the test’s consistency measured by the ability to replicate results.  Id. at 
75. 
 236 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 189-90; see also PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 
229, at 47.  Validity is the extent to which a test measures what it purports to measure.  
Id. at 96. 
 237 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 47. 
 238 Id. at  48. 
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based upon a hierarchical model of intelligence that is tested 
through the use of various subtests.239 The SB:FE contains fifteen 
subtests, which measure Verbal Reasoning, Quantitative Reasoning, 
Abstract/Visual Reasoning, and Short Term Memory.240  The 
examiner totals the scores in these four areas and converts them to a 
composite IQ score.241  The examiner then compares the composite 
IQ score against a mean of one hundred with a standard deviation of 
sixteen.242  The SB:FE classifies a subject with an IQ of sixty-seven or 
below as mentally retarded.243 
The developers of the SB:FE standardized the test on a sample of 
over five thousand subjects selected to be representative of the 
population in the 1980 United States Census.244  The test is 
representative of the target population and, for the most part, has a 
high reliability.245  While the SB:FE is a valid test of intellectual 
ability,246 it has several weaknesses.247  These include the lack of 
uniformity in composite scores among age groups and the fact that 
the SB:FE suggests time limits but does not require that they be 
enforced.248  Additionally, to lower testing time, the SB:FE allows the 
examiner to administer shortened versions of the individual subtests 
and this may result in a reduction of the test’s reliability.249  Also 
problematic is the fact that SB:FE composite IQ scores have been 
found to be higher than the comparative WAIS-III IQ scores by an 
average of seven points.250 
 
 239 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 193. 
 240 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 52-53.  The Verbal Reasoning 
Subtests are Vocabulary, Comprehension, Absurdities, and Verbal Relations.  Id. 
Quantative Reasoning is tested through the Quantitative, Number Series, and 
Equation Building Subtests.  Id.  The Abstract/Visual Reasoning Subtests are Pattern 
Analysis, Copying, Matrices, and Paper Folding and Cutting.  Id.  Finally, the subtests 
of Bead Memory, Memory for Sentences, Memory for Digits, and Memory for Objects 
test Short-Term Memory.  Id. 
 241 Id. at  53. 
 242 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 53. 
 243 Id. 
 244 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 194.  The sample was chosen to represent the same 
“geographic region, community size, ethnic group, age, and sex” as the census 
population.  Id. 
 245 Id. at 196.  The reliability of the Memory for Objects subtest is only fair, but the 
composite score reliability is exceptional.  Id. 
 246 Id. at 197. 
 247 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 54. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 198.  This means that, on average, an individual 
with a WAIS-III IQ score of 100 will be assessed at an IQ of 107 on the SB:FE.  Id.  
This can be problematic because it can lead to very different diagnostic impressions. 
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B.  Testing Adaptive Functioning 
An assessment of adaptive behavior is an evaluation of how well 
individuals “meet the standards of personal independence and social 
responsibility” expected for their age and cultural background.251  
Diagnostic assessment instruments that measure functional ability in 
many areas—including communication, self-care, and social skills—
are used to evaluate adaptive behavior.252  The subject, or a third party 
who is familiar with the subject, provides the information needed to 
make the assessment.253  The AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale and the 
Camelot Behavioral Checklist are both well-known measures of 
adaptive behavior.254 
The AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale (the “ABS-RC:2”) was 
designed to measure “an individual’s strengths and weaknesses 
among adaptive domains and factors.”255  The norm-referenced test 
relies on many different factors to provide a percentile score.256  
Described as “a psychometric tour de force that borders on overkill,” 
the ABS-RC:2 is both reliable and valid.257  The test is an excellent 
measure of an individual’s adaptive behavior levels.258 
The Camelot Behavioral Checklist also evaluates the adaptive 
behavior in adults.259  The test consists of almost four hundred 
behavior descriptions grouped into domains and subdomains.260  The 
domain scores are converted to norm-referenced percentiles that 
indicate the individual’s level of functioning.261  The test has excellent 
 
Id.  It is unclear whether this is the result of the SB:FE intelligence score being too 
high or the WISC-III intelligence score being too low.  Id. 
 251 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 195. 
 252 Id.  An examiner should focus on “communication, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, self-care, home living, social skills, 
leisure, and work.”  Id. 
 253 Id.  The required information can be obtained from a parent, former teachers, 
direct service providers, or correctional facility employees.  Id. 
 254 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236-37.  Although there are many instruments that 
test adaptive behavior, these two are appropriate for both adult populations and for 
diagnosis purposes.  Id.  Other scales can only be used on children or for remedial 
purposes.  Id. 
 255 PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 229, at 196. 
 256 Id. The test was normed on a sample of over 4,000 developmentally disabled 
individuals from forty-three states.  GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236. 
 257 GREGORY, supra note 163, at 236. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 237. 
 260 Id.  The behavior descriptions include items such as ‘“pours liquids,’ ‘waxes 
floors,’ ‘can boil food,’ and ‘can do stapling jobs.’”  Id. 
 261 Id.  The instrument was normed on a sample of 624 developmentally disabled 
individuals.  GREGORY, supra note 163, at 237. 
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reliability and its scores highly correlate with IQ scores obtained on 
the WISC-III and the SB:FE.262 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
While the Supreme Court has found the execution of the 
mentally retarded to be unconstitutional, the Court’s decision not to 
set a standard for mental retardation is problematic.  The wide 
disparity in the current state definitions of mental retardation already 
results in “significant differences as to exactly who it is that is 
included under the protective umbrella of prohibition.”263  Further, 
the absence of uniform testing requirements often results in 
opposing expert witnesses using drastically different testing methods 
to come to contradictory conclusions.264 
Even a cursory examination of current statutory definitions 
reveals the necessity of implementing a uniform statutory definition 
and mandatory assessment guidelines.265  To that end, the AAMR 
definition is best suited for determining mental retardation in 
criminal populations.266  Moreover, because the field of psychology 
accepts these testing methods for determining intelligence and 
adaptive functioning, state legislators should also accept them.267  
Statutes should require that intelligence be assessed using either the 
WAIS-III or the SB:FE, and that adaptive functioning be measured 
through the use of the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale or the 
Camelot Behavioral Checklist.268 
A.  The Absence of a Uniform Definition of Mental Retardation 
The circumstances surrounding the crimes committed by Son H. 
Fleming and Horace F. Dunkins are similar.269  Both defendants 
“committed notoriously brutal crimes and were classified as ‘mildly 
retarded,’ possessing IQs just below seventy.”270  Both were black 
 
 262 Id. 
 263 Respondent’s Brief at 40, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452). 
 264 See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text. 
 265 See supra PART II.A. 
 266 See infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra PART III. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Charles-Edward Anderson, Low-IQ Murderers: States seek executions of mentally 
retarded convicts, 75 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (1989). 
 270 Id.  Horrace Dunkins was convicted for the rape, torture, and murder of a 
young mother of four.  REED, supra note 50, at 88.  The victim was murdered outside 
of her home where her children were sleeping.  Id.  She was stabbed sixty-six times 
and left tied to a tree where her husband found her when he returned from work in 
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defendants convicted of capital murder by juries who were 
uninformed of their mental retardation.271  More importantly, 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry, Fleming and 
Dunkins were the first mentally retarded offenders scheduled for 
execution.272  Fleming lived because he was on death row in Georgia, 
while Dunkins died because he had the misfortune of committing his 
crime in Alabama.273 
While this example occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s ban 
on the execution of the mentally retarded, today it would still be 
possible for Alabama to execute Dunkins regardless of Georgia’s 
treatment of a similarly situated offender.  If Alabama adopts a 
mental retardation statute requiring an IQ of sixty-five or less, as is 
the standard in both Arizona and Arkansas, then Dunkins would still 
be eligible for the death penalty today.274  If Arizona sets the 
minimum IQ at seventy, like Nebraska and New Mexico, then 
Dunkins would live.275  Moreover, Alabama could adopt the same 
statute as Georgia, and still execute Dunkins.276  If, like Georgia’s 
statute, the new Alabama statute does not set a minimum IQ then the 
issue of Dunkins’ mental retardation would rest on whether or not 
the Alabama court believed him to be retarded—the Georgia courts’ 
treatment of a virtually identical prisoner would not carry any 
 
the morning.  Id. at 89.  Dunkins, who never finished high school, was functionally 
illiterate and had the mental status of a ten-to-twelve-year old.  Id. 
Son H. Fleming was sentenced to death for the murder of a small town police 
chief.  Peter Applebome, 2 States Grapple with Issues of Executing Retarded Men, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 1989, at A12.  The police chief had stopped a car driven by Fleming, 
unaware that Fleming and two accomplices had just committed a robbery. Id.  They 
murdered the police chief and dumped his body in a swamp.  Id.  Approximately 
eleven years prior to the murder, Fleming, who had never learned to read or write, 
had received a shotgun blast to his face causing him to lose almost all of his mental 
capacities.  REED, supra note 50, at 128. 
 271 Applebome, supra note 270, at A12. 
 272 Id. 
 273 REED, supra note 50, at 88-89.  Fleming had his death sentence vacated 
because, unlike Alabama, Georgia law did not allow for the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders.  Id. 
Dunkins’ execution received national attention because the electric chair failed 
to kill him on the first attempt.  Peter Applebome, 2 Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1989, at 1.  Blaming human error for the failure, the state 
reported that the switch had to be thrown a second time before Dunkins could be 
declared dead.  Id. 
 274 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 
2001). 
 275 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 
2002). 
 276 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002). 
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weight.277 
Similarly, the fate of Eddie Mitchell, a death row inmate in 
Louisiana, depends on how the Louisiana legislature or courts define 
mental retardation.278  Following an unsuccessful attempt to borrow 
money from his victim, Mitchell killed the man when he struck him 
in the head with a stick.279  When questioned by the police, Mitchell 
waived his right to counsel and confessed to the crime.280  Ultimately, 
a jury sentenced him to death.281 
Eddie Mitchell has an IQ of sixty-six.282  As a child, he had to 
repeat several grades, and his classmates mocked him for his 
stupidity.283  When he dropped out of school, he was eighteen and in 
the eighth grade.284  Mitchell’s intellectual capacities are so impaired 
that he was unable to learn how to play baseball and his Cub Scout 
master reports, “on the rare occasions when he actually caught the 
ball, ‘he would just hold on to it, maybe kiss it, but never throw it 
on.’”285  Mitchell’s fate is in the hands of the Louisiana legislature and 
courts, and turns on how they choose to define mental retardation.  
If Louisiana chooses to set the minimum IQ for mental retardation at 
sixty-five, Mitchell will still be executed. A minimum IQ of seventy, 
however, means that Mitchell will live. 
These cases illustrate the problem with the absence of a uniform 
definition for mental retardation.  The AAMR, DSM-IV-TR, and APA 
definitions all provide a similar standard for the assessment of mental 
retardation.286  Consequently, the decision as to which definition to 
adopt is really a matter of which is the most suitable for codification 
and application in a criminal law context. 
The APA definition is substantially similar to the DSM-IV-TR 
 
 277 See id. 
 278 Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental 
Retardation § VII, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-07.htm 
(March 20, 2001) (on file with author). 
 279 Louisiana v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 253 (La. 1996). 
 280 Id.  It has been reported that Mitchell believed that waiving his rights meant to 
wave his right hand.  Human Rights Watch, supra note 278. 
 281 Mitchell, 674 So. 2d at 252. 
 282 Human Rights Watch, supra note 278. 
 283 Id.  Mitchell had to repeat the first grade twice and the sixth grade three times.  
Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id.  In part of a statement provided to his attorneys, in large childish letters, 
Mitchell wrote, “I love to shop in the store.  I like ice cream very.  Smile.  I like horse.  
I like food to eat.  Yes I like cat, and dog.”  Id. 
 286 See supra PART II.B–D. 
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definition with the exception of the required age of onset.287  The 
APA specifies that the mental disability must have manifested prior to 
age twenty-two, while the DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR require the 
presence of symptoms before the age of eighteen.288  The purpose of 
this age requirement is to ensure that the mental retardation 
developed during the developmental period, as opposed to forms of 
brain damage that occur later in life.289 
In a criminal law setting, the age requirement serves the added 
purpose of “ensur[ing] that defendants may not feign mental 
retardation once charged with a capital offense.”290  Under this 
standard, faking cognitive impairment following an arrest would not 
be sufficient for a diagnosis because the offender’s symptoms would 
need to have been observed prior to the specified age.291  Given that 
malingering is a concern whenever you are dealing with a criminal 
population, both the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions are 
better suited to this population than the APA definition with its 
higher age limit.292 
The AAMR is “the principal professional organization in the 
field of mental retardation.”293  The AAMR’s definition of mental 
retardation has influenced courts,294 legislatures,295 and the DSM-IV 
 
 287 Compare APA, supra note 213, at 113, with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49. 
 288 Compare APA, supra note 213, at 113, with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49, and 
AAMR 2002, supra note 189.  The requirement that symptoms be present should not 
to be mistaken for a requirement that the individual be diagnosed before the age of 
eighteen.  See DSM-IV-TR, supra note202, at 42; see also AAMR 2002, supra note 189.  
The DSM-IV-TR and the AAMR definitions do not require a diagnosis before the 
individual reaches the age of majority.  Id.  Instead, they require that the individual 
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definition.296  As the AAMR’s definition has changed, similar changes 
appeared in both newly drafted statutes,297 and the DSM definitions.298  
In all likelihood, the next version of the DSM will once again mirror 
the current AAMR definition of mental retardation.299 
Additionally, the current AAMR definition is more appropriate 
for the evaluation of mental retardation in criminal defendants than 
the DSM-IV-TR definition.  The DSM-IV-TR definition describes the 
adaptive behavior component as “concurrent deficits or impairments 
in present adaptive functioning . . . in at least two of the following 
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal 
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic 
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.”300  The purpose of this 
conceptualization of adaptive behavior is to determine “how 
effectively individuals cope with common life demands,” so as to 
establish the individual’s needs for services and supports.301 
The AAMR definition is also concerned with the identification of 
mental retardation in order to develop personalized plans with 
individualized supports.302  Still, the wording of the current AAMR 
definition is better suited for evaluations of defendants facing the 
death penalty.303  The AAMR definition now requires that deficits 
manifest “in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and 
practical adaptive skills.”304  This definition requires that the disability 
“be manifested in real-world disability in the individual’s life” and 
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3, with GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (2002), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie 
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 300 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 202, at 49. 
 301 Id. at 42. 
 302 AAMR 2002, supra note 189. 
 303 Ellis, supra note 289, at 8. 
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“focuses on broad categories of adaptive impairment,” rather than 
“service related skill areas.”305  It is the presence of a “real-world 
disability” and not the formulation of a treatment plan that is of 
importance to the judicial system.306 
The DSM-IV-TR definition exists as part of a uniform and 
standardized system utilized by practitioners to classify and diagnose 
mental retardation.307  Consequently, the DSM-IV-TR definition 
provides a clear systematic approach for diagnosing mental 
retardation.308  Conversely, the AAMR created its definition to help 
identify those with mental retardation in order to develop a personal 
plan with individualized supports.309  Nonetheless, in light of the 
current AAMR definition’s better applicability in the criminal 
context, as well as the trend among prior legislatures in codifying 
AAMR definitions, the current AAMR definition provides the best 
standard for assessing the mental retardation of offenders facing a 
possible death sentence. 
B.  The Lack of Uniform Testing Requirements 
Due in part to variable methods of assessing mental retardation 
prosecution and defense witnesses often come to opposing 
conclusions regarding a defendant’s mental capacity.  In Atkins, the 
defense expert, Dr. Evan Nelson, concluded that Atkins was mentally 
retarded following test results from a full-scale WAIS-III intelligence 
test; interviews with Atkins, his family, and correctional officers; and a 
review of school records, court records, and police reports.310  Dr. 
Nelson validated Atkins’ low IQ score by looking at both “tell tales 
within the test that would reveal ‘faking,’” and independent 
information that confirmed Atkins’ life long low level of 
functioning.311  In comparison, the expert for the prosecution 
concluded that Atkins was of average intelligence without 
administering an intelligence test.312  Dr. Stanton Samenow simply 
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 310 Petitioner’s Brief at 9-10, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452). 
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asked Atkins a few questions taken from an outdated intelligence test, 
reviewed his school records, and interviewed the correctional staff.313  
When confronted about his use of an outdated test, “Dr. Samenow 
replied that he was not ‘doing a full evaluation with testing.’”314  It is 
egregious that the State’s witness did not utilize any of the various 
appropriate intelligence tests before providing such crucial and 
important testimony. 
Although best illustrated by Atkins, this discrepancy also existed 
during the cases of both Oliver Cruz and Ernest McCarver.  When the 
state of Texas executed Oliver Cruz on Aug 9, 2000,315 defense experts 
classified Cruz as retarded based upon his IQ of sixty-four and his 
history of difficulties.316  Conversely, the state acknowledged that Cruz 
was not “very smart,”317 but prosecutors refused to acknowledge his 
retardation because he had once scored in the low average range on 
an intelligence test.318  Lawyers for Ernest McCarver argue that 
repeated scores on intelligence tests showed mental retardation, 
while the prosecution disputes that finding based in part on the 
assertion that McCarver carefully planned a murder.319 
The American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct (the “APA Ethics Code”) provides 
standards of professional conduct for psychologists.320  Although the 
APA Ethics Code was written specifically for APA members, the code 
is often applied by state boards and courts to others practicing in the 
field of psychology.321  The APA Ethics Code clearly states that 
psychologists who perform evaluations for the courts must base their 
assessments “on information . . . sufficient to provide appropriate 
substantiation for their findings.”322  Further, psychologists may not 
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base their evaluations on tests and measures that are outdated and, 
therefore, obsolete.323 
The APA has also created the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic 
Psychologists (the “Specialty Guidelines”).324  The Specialty 
Guidelines are an aspirational model for psychologists acting as 
experts for the judicial system.325  They provide that forensic 
psychologists have an obligation to know and use current and 
acceptable standards of evaluation.326  Moreover, the Specialty 
Guidelines require that forensic psychologists must “make every 
reasonable effort” to conduct an adequate examination and should 
avoid providing testimony “about the psychological characteristics of 
particular individuals when they have not had an opportunity to 
conduct an examination of the individual adequate to the scope of 
the statements, opinions, or conclusions . . . .”327 
Under these guidelines, the evaluation performed by Dr. 
Samenow was wholly inadequate to support his conclusions and 
blatantly unethical.  The APA Ethics Code and the Specialty 
Guidelines require that psychologists, who assess mental retardation 
for the courts, do a thorough evaluation that includes the use of all 
available up-to-date testing methods.328  The diagnosis of mental 
retardation “cannot be accomplished by casual examination or 
impressionistic observations.”329  A competent evaluation must involve 
both the skilled administration of a standardized intelligence test and 
a thorough assessment of adaptive behavior.330  Legislators should 
require the application of these standards to all expert testimony 
regarding whether or not a death eligible defendant is mentally 
retarded. 
There are valid and reliable psychological tests for determining 
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both intelligence and adaptive functioning.331  Both the WAIS-III and 
the SB:FE are extremely reliable individual intelligence tests, and the 
AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale and the Camelot Behavioral Checklist 
are validated measures of adaptive behavior.332  Evaluations of a 
defendant’s mental capacity determines whether he or she will live or 
die, and as such, state statutes should require that expert witnesses 
utilize appropriate methods of testing. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, states use several different definitions of and accepted 
procedures for testing and assessing mental retardation.  This lack of 
uniformity is problematic because, as a practical matter, whether or 
not an individual is retarded will depend upon which state he is in.333 
Therefore, even though the Supreme Court has banned the 
execution of the mentally retarded, someone who is not death 
eligible in one state because of mental retardation can still be 
executed in another state.  This will result in the arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty.334 
Consequently, to avoid this problem, state legislatures should all 
adopt the current AAMR definition as the standard for determining 
mental retardation.  Further, they should require that the evaluation 
be done by an expert who bases his assessment on both a full-scale, 
standardized individual intelligence test and a diagnostic assessment 
instrument for adaptive behaviors. 
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